Forging transnational ties from below:Challenging the Brazilian mining giant Vale S.A. across the South Atlantic by Cezne, Eric
  
 University of Groningen
Forging transnational ties from below
Cezne, Eric
Published in:
The Extractive Industries and Society
DOI:
10.1016/j.exis.2019.10.007
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2019
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Cezne, E. (2019). Forging transnational ties from below: Challenging the Brazilian mining giant Vale S.A.
across the South Atlantic. The Extractive Industries and Society, 6(4), 1174-1183.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2019.10.007
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 13-01-2020
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
The Extractive Industries and Society
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/exis
Original article
Forging transnational ties from below: Challenging the Brazilian mining
giant Vale S.A. across the South Atlantic
Eric Cezne
Department of International Relations and International Organization, Faculty of Arts, University of Groningen, PO Box 716, 9700 AS, Groningen, the Netherlands








A B S T R A C T
This paper discusses how the internationalization of the Brazilian mining corporation Vale S.A, particularly its
incursion into Mozambique, has given rise to transnational contestation eﬀorts to resist extraction, from below
and along a South-South axis. It does so by approaching the politics and practices of mobilization of the
International Articulation of those Aﬀected by Vale (AV), paying special attention to the ties forged between
Mozambican and Brazilian civil society. This paper contends that the AV’s transnational activism and mobili-
zation strength is context-dependent and deﬁned by given political opportunities, which aﬀect actors’ capacity
and propensity to mobilize against Vale. Focusing on the determinants shaping the AV’s engagement in con-
tentious politics, this paper analyzes which political opportunities have contributed to its establishment, how
resources were mobilized to pursue transnational collective action and to push for change, and to which extent
shifting political and economic circumstances in Brazil and Mozambique have aﬀected mobilization prospects.
This paper provides a critical, bottom-up perspective on the outward expansion of Vale as a Southern mining
multinational and contributes to the literature on resistance to extractivism, exploring such dynamics in a
transnational and South-South conﬁguration.
1. Introduction
In recent years, Brazil has been aﬀected by a struggling economy
and considerable political turmoil (Boito and Saad-Filho, 2016;
Garmany and Pereira, 2018). In the meanwhile, Brazilian mining giant
Vale S.A. (henceforth Vale) has faced a series of setbacks and negative
appraisals in light of the destructive and lethal tailings dam tragedies at
iron ore extraction sites in Brumadinho (2019) and Mariana (2015),
both in the state of Minas Gerais, Brazil. Yet, not that far back, as-
sessments used to take a diﬀerent tone. For most of the 2000s and early
2010s, favorable domestic and international circumstances allowed the
Brazilian state to increase its diplomatic standing (Abdenur and
Marcondes, 2014; Burges, 2017; Cezne and Hamann, 2016), and Vale to
seek new resource frontiers abroad (White, 2013; Moldovan, 2018;
Milanez et al., 2018). This has been particularly noticeable in Mo-
zambique, where Brazil laced the increase of its economic footprint into
the language of cooperation, solidarity and cultural proximity (Alden
et al., 2017) and Vale was awarded the concession of the Moatize coal
reserves – one of the world’s largest unexploited coal deposits (ADB and
OECD, 2008: 464). Vale’s arrival is among Mozambique’s largest for-
eign direct investments (FDI) following more than a decade of conﬂict
(1977–1992) and has raised hopes of a shift in economic landscapes:
from one dependent on Western aid to one centered on investments,
new partnerships with the “emerging powers”, and South–South co-
operation (Alden and Chichava, 2014; Alden et al., 2017; Nogueira
et al., 2017).
This paper brings a critical, bottom-up perspective to Vale’s ex-
pansion as a Southern mining multinational. It does so particularly in
the context of Brazil–Mozambique relations by discussing how the in-
ternationalization of Vale has concomitantly provided opportunities for
contestation synergies to be explored and articulated from below and
along a South-South axis. In this vein, this paper describes and analyzes
the origins and politics of the mobilization of the International
Articulation of those Aﬀected by Vale (Articulação Internacional dos
Atingidos e Atingidas pela Vale), or simply the Aﬀected by Vale (Atingidos
pela Vale, henceforth AV), which was established in 2009. Focusing on
the transnational ties forged between Mozambican and Brazilian civil
society within the AV, the paper picks up on alternative ﬂows and ex-
periences of (inter-)Southern cooperation and highlights how and under
which circumstances these have been harnessed to challenge Vale’s
extractive activities in both countries – and beyond. As such, this paper
provides a timely, empirically backed contribution to scholarship ap-
proaching resistance dynamics in the extractive industries (see Acuña,
2015; Conde, 2017) while adding to a burgeoning literary analysis of
South-South civil society partnerships and advocacy networks (see
Bond and Garcia, 2015; Shankland and Gonçalves, 2016; Milhorance
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Building on “political opportunity theory”, particularly as it is de-
veloped in the works of Tarrow (1998, 2005) and Meyer (2003, 2004)
on the politics of social mobilization, this paper argues that the AV’s
ability to transnationally engage in contentious politics is shaped by
speciﬁc opportunities. These are given by the external, and often
shifting, circumstances in the broader political system (termed “the
political opportunity structure” in this theory), which in turn aﬀect
actors’ ability and propensity to mobilize – and to do so eﬀectively.
Relying on these theoretical insights, this paper’s argument is under-
pinned by the following research questions: How did Vale’s globalized
scope and internationalization act as a political opportunity for the
establishment of the AV, and how did this contribute, more speciﬁcally,
to the forging of transnational ties between Mozambican and Brazilian
civil society? How did the AV engage in transnational, collective action,
and to which ends? And to which extent have variations in the sur-
rounding political opportunity structure, particularly in Brazil and
Mozambique, changed the AV’s incentives and prospects for mobiliza-
tion over the years?
The article draws on data from two ﬁeld trips to Mozambique,
carried out in June 2018 and between October and December 2018, and
one research visit to Brazil in April 2019. The ﬁeldwork in Mozambique
was conducted in the country’s capital city Maputo, in the central
province of Tete, where Vale’s Moatize coal mining concession is lo-
cated, and along the length of the Nacala Corridor, the railway that
connects Vale’s mine to the Nacala port facilities on Mozambique’s
northern coast. The research visit to Brazil encompassed the cities of
São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Brasília. As part of the research for this
paper, I have interviewed representatives of grassroots groups within
the AV in Mozambique and Brazil,1 three Brazilian academics (two of
whom have ties to AV social movements) who are researching Vale and
Brazilian FDI in Africa,2 a former Vale executive, and Brazil’s Foreign
Minister Celso Amorim (2003–2010) and conducted a focus group with
Mozambican extractive industry business consultants. The information
obtained during ﬁeldwork is complemented by the analysis of key AV
texts such as the Articulation’s annual reports and meetings’ dossiers as
well as website and social media content.
This paper proceeds as follows. First, I provide a brief introduction
to Vale, reﬂecting on its role in the global extractive economy as well as
on its degree of political and economic interconnectedness with the
Brazilian state. In the context of the ﬁrm’s international expansion, I
highlight how Vale’s extractive business in Mozambique was aided by
state and corporate rhetorical references to “South-South cooperation,”
putting the company’s investments in a positive light. Second, I de-
monstrate how the literature has increasingly interrogated this in-
strumentalization of South-South credentials in the legitimation of
economic projects, to which forms of civil society resistance, including
along a South-South axis, have become increasingly common. Similarly,
I underscore how the literature has long reﬂected on the contested
nature of Vale’s extractivism. I thereafter propose the notion of political
opportunity structure to analyze the AV’s politics of mobilization, ar-
guing that it oﬀers productive angles to investigate the hitherto un-
derexplored interfaces between resistance to extraction and the emer-
gence of South-South contestation ties. Third, by focusing on the
connections forged between Mozambican and Brazilian civil society,
this paper analyzes the politics of mobilization of the AV more speci-
ﬁcally. This is done in three steps, each of which addressing one of the
outlined research questions above. I start by arguing how Vale’s out-
ward expansion, particularly in the late 2000s, set the context and of-
fered opportunities for the emergence of the AV and how this has re-
inforced transnational advocacy connections between Mozambican and
Brazilian civil society. This is followed by a discussion of the AV’s
mobilization practices and strategies, addressing how the AV has
transnationally engaged in contentious politics and pushed for change.
Lastly, this paper argues how shifting domestic trends in both Brazil and
Mozambique have resulted in a less favorable political opportunity
structure for the AV, hampering its capacity to mobilize and to forge
allegiances in recent years.
2. Vale S.A.: disaster-ridden yet an exportable Brazilian national
champion
On January 25, 2019, in Brumadinho, in the state of Minas Gerais,
Brazil, a wave of mud was unleashed from a burst dam holding the
byproducts of iron ore mining. Along its path downhill, the mudﬂow
from the ruptured reservoir destroyed nearly everything, from homes to
company oﬃces and cafeteria, claiming the lives of hundreds of people
(New York Times, 2019). The disaster occurred at Dam 1 of the Córrego
do Feijão iron ore mine, and the mining waste – technically known as
tailings – contaminated surrounding rivers and soil. The death toll has
been determined to be around 250, making the Brumadinho cata-
strophe the world’s most deadly dam-related tragedy since 1985.3 Little
over than three years earlier and only 120 km away, a similar iron ore
tailings dam burst in the Brazilian municipality of Mariana had released
a large volume of toxic sludge, which had lasting social and environ-
mental impacts. The mud ﬂow killed 19 people, displaced hundreds,
and is described as Brazil’s worst (human-induced) environmental dis-
aster (Fernandes et al., 2016). The Brazilian mining corporation Vale is
central to both disasters. In Brumadinho, the Córrego do Feijão mine has
been under Vale’s concession since 2001. The dam that collapsed in
Mariana belonged to Samarco Mineração S.A., an enterprise jointly
owned by Anglo-Australian mining multinational BHP and Vale.
In light of these disasters and the ensuing visibility brought by
media headlines, public opinion about Vale has been dominated by
outrage and anger (The Guardian, 2019; Financial Times, 2019). In the
wake of events in Brumadinho, the ﬁrm has been de-listed from the UN
Global Compact (United Nations Global Compact (UNGC, 2019), and an
investigation committee linked to the Minas Gerais legislative house
has asked for the criminal indictment of some of its executives and
employees (Cherem, 2019). Yet, in spite of this reputational damage,
the company’s image in business and political circles used to be an
overwhelmingly positive one; regarded as an icon of Brazil’s successes,
a national champion. Vale oversees operations across 30 countries; in
revenue terms, it was ranked among the world’s top ﬁve mining com-
panies in 2018, and it is the world’s foremost extractor of iron and
nickel ore (Vale, 2018c; Statista, 2019). Vale’s global outreach and its
role in the extractive commodity market has in many ways become the
prime example of a reconﬁgured geography that saw Southern coun-
tries and their ﬁrms emerging as important players and investors (Luo
and Tung, 2007; Ramamurti and Singh, 2009; Marinov and Marinova,
2012). This is further underscored by the long “capitalism of linkages”
between Vale and the Brazilian state: it went from being a wholly
government-controlled company upon its establishment in 1942 until
its privatization in 1997, to its current institutional arrangement under
private ownership in which the government is able to exert inﬂuence
through the so-called “golden shares” (which give the government veto
rights on strategic matters) and equity-holding shares held by the state-
1 In Mozambique, this included interviewing representatives of an organiza-
tion providing judicial assistance to mining-aﬀected communities and re-
presentatives of a mineworkers’ trade union. In Brazil, an interview was con-
ducted with members of a social movement advocating on behalf of populations
aﬀected by the construction of dams.
2 At the time of ﬁeldwork, all these scholars held academic positions at uni-
versities. One of the researchers had ties with a civil society organization ad-
vancing alternative development policies in South America, and another one
worked with a movement calling for social justice along Vale’s logistic corridors
in Brazil.
3 At the time of writing, a death toll of 251 was conﬁrmed; 19 victims are still
missing. For the updated ﬁgures: http://www.defesacivil.mg.gov.br/
E. Cezne The Extractive Industries and Society 6 (2019) 1174–1183
1175
owned Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) (Lazzarini, 2011:
21; Burges, 2017: 114). Along with other leading Brazilian ﬁrms,
especially in the engineering and energy sectors, the mining corpora-
tion has also beneﬁted from state diplomatic support and public ﬁnance
lending (Casanova and Kassum, 2014; Hochstetler, 2014).
Vale has sought to expand its activities not only within, but also
outside Brazil, particularly in the 2000s and early 2010s, amid the
bright prospects underlying the “Brazil rising” narrative, coupled with
the favorable winds of the commodities super-cycle (Da Silva et al.,
2009). Besides the one in Mozambique, it has acquired mining con-
cessions and operations in Canada, New Caledonia, Indonesia, and
Zambia (Vale, 2018a) and has attempted to engage in iron ore extrac-
tion in Guinea (Slattery, 2019). Africa in particular was key in this
outward move. According to Vale’s former CEO Roger Agnelli (2009),
gaining a foothold in Africa represented an opportunity for the com-
pany due to the continent’s still unexplored reserves of natural re-
sources. Moreover, Vale stood to make proﬁts in markets that were
overlooked by Northern ﬁrms who had been aﬀected by the turbulence
of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis. The fact that Africa is closer to China and
the other emerging markets in Asia than Brazil is another advantage, as
was suggested by a former Vale executive interviewed for this research:
“exporting minerals from Africa would considerably cut the distance
and delivery time to our major clients in Asia.”4
A telling example of this process is Vale’s expansion into
Mozambique, where the company won a bid in 2004 to explore the
Moatize coal deposits in the central Mozambican province of Tete
(Campbell, 2014). The terms of the concession with the Mozambican
government were deﬁned in 2007, and mining operations eﬀectively
started in 2011 (Vale, 2017). Estimated to be the world’s ﬁfth largest
coal deposit, the Moatize mine supplies coal for metallurgical and en-
ergetic purposes and is expected to have a life-time of approximately 35
years, with reserves predicted to be 2.4 billion tons (ADB and OECD,
2008: 464; Bryceson and MacKinnon, 2012). Given the centrality of
logistics in Vale’s business model, a multi-modal mine–rail–port infra-
structure – the Nalaca Corridor – was developed to enable the transport
and subsequent export of the mineral through the exclusive coal
terminal at the deep water port of Nacala-a-Velha on Mozambique’s
northern Indian coast.
Vale’s advancement into Mozambique grew out of a series of formal
and informal ties forged by and between the Brazilian and Mozambican
governments. As explained to me by Brazil’s former Foreign Minister
Celso Amorim, in the beginning of Vale’s advancement, the Brazilian
government helped by mediating Vale’s interactions with the
Mozambican government: “Brazil has oﬀered support. And sometimes
we even had to call the attention of Vale’s representatives to things.”5
This was complemented by claims pointing at Vale’s positive diﬀer-
entiation in light of its Southern and Brazilian origins. As former Bra-
zilian President Lula underscored during the visit of Mozambican Pre-
sident Joaquim Chissano to Brasília in August 2004: “Mozambicans
won’t regret it if Vale wins the bidding, because beyond exploiting coal
it can help in other projects…. It is a company that has a strong social
sense and vision” (Lula da Silva, 2004). In what became his signature
quote when speaking on Brazil–Africa relations, Foreign Minister Celso
Amorim said that “for every African problem, there is a Brazilian so-
lution.”6 He subsequently made the point that this “favors the (Brazi-
lian) presence, technical cooperation, and also companies, naturally (in
Africa).”7 Mozambican political stakeholders and business re-
presentatives have echoed these views. Speaking about Vale’s invest-
ments in Mozambique, the country’s Foreign Minister Oldemiro Baloi
remarked that: “By investing I do not just mean what they are doing in
coal, ﬁnancially investing, but also in terms of capacity building”
(Burges, 2017: 123). For a Mozambican business consultant, Vale’s
arrival was illustrative of a new era of partnerships with the Southern
emerging powers and nurtured aspirations of an unprecedented eco-
nomic development: “After Mozambique’s civil war, Vale was the ﬁrst
company to establish itself. From the government’s perspective, it was
an opportunity to improve the business environment and to attract
other companies.”8 Speaking on behalf of the corporation, Vale’s CEO
has referred to the ﬁrm’s arrival in Mozambique as a sign of the in-
tegration between Africa and the Americas, which he envisioned as a
“new Pangea” – alluding to the supercontinent that existed millions of
years ago as a part of which the coasts of Brazil and West Africa were
interlocked (Agnelli, 2009).
3. Resisting (Vale’s) extraction along a South-South axis
Arguably, the geographical, historical, and social similarities of
Southern countries do not necessarily mean that the implementation of
development and business projects will be unproblematic. In this vein,
scholars have denounced the deployment of narratives resorting to
Southern, developing country, and post-colonial identities, especially
when deployed by China and the other Southern BRICS countries, as
means to conceal “sub-imperial” interests – expressed through the
search of spheres of inﬂuence and material gain by the new centers of
capital accumulation (Bond and Garcia, 2015; Bond, 2016). Similar
arguments have permeated analyses of Southern FDIs and development
projects in Africa. While these projects resort to a diﬀerent rhetoric,
many scholars have argued that at the ground level they over-
whelmingly focus on the same economic sectors – mostly extractive and
agricultural – that Western states have long held on the continent (see
Mohan and Power, 2008; Shaw et al., 2009; Johnston, 2017), thus
conﬁguring a “new scramble” for Africa (Carmody, 2016).9 Other
scholars have considered that the experiences brought by investments
and development projects from Southern countries often have contested
and exclusionary roots at home (see Alden and Davies, 2006; Sauvant
et al., 2010; Scoones et al., 2016). At the same time, the eﬀects of these
initiatives have been discussed and challenged by civil society net-
works, ranging from autonomous, localized networks, to networks in-
volving partnerships with larger, professionalized NGOs, politically
like-minded state actors, and, increasingly, through the exchanges in
and articulation of South-South transnational advocacy networks across
the involved nations (Osuoka and Zalik, 2010; Schulpen and Habraken,
2013; Shankland and Gonçalves, 2016; Muhr, 2016; Milhorance and
Bursztyn, 2017). In line with Angosto-Ferrández (2014), this last kind
of network accounts for the people-based dimension of the Global
South, where shared experiences of exclusion, marginalization, and
exploitation produce a collective transnational political identity.
As noted by Shankland and Gonçalves (2016), the notion of the
“South-South”, underpinned by similarity-based claims, has thus of-
fered a productive imaginary and legitimizing power to both the pro-
motion and contestation of Southern countries’ economic and devel-
opment projects elsewhere in the developing world. In this regard, the
South-South transnationalism of contestation eﬀorts, binding groups
across the involved nations, is enabled by and provides a counter-he-
gemonic challenge to mainstream (state and corporate) uses of the term
“South-South”. In the context of Brazil–Mozambique relations, this
“tension” has been well-documented and researched in the case of the
ProSAVANA rural development program, established around 2011 and
involving the governments and private sectors of Brazil, Mozambique,
4 Interview, former Vale executive. São Paulo, Brazil, April 2019.
5 Interview, Mr. Celso Amorim, former Foreign Minister of Brazil (2003-
2010). Rio de Janeiro, April 2019.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Focus group, extractive industry business consultants. Maputo,
Mozambique, June 2018.
9 For a historical perspective on extractive-driven ﬂows across the South
Atlantic, see Ofosu-Mensah (2017).
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and Japan. Through the adoption of Brazil’s tropical agribusiness ex-
periences, the program was premised on a strategy of creating an en-
abling environment for commercial agriculture in northern Mo-
zambique, particularly in the Nacala corridor’s catchment area (see
Fingermann, 2015). A range of scholarly accounts on ProSAVANA has,
however, pointed out its controversial nature: it neglected the views of
small-holders and threatened land tenure, human rights, and food se-
curity (Nogueira and Ollinaho, 2013; Wolford and Nehring, 2015;
Durán and Chichava, 2017). As a result, the tropical agribusiness in-
ternationalization eﬀort embodied by the ProSAVANA has prompted a
“South-South cooperation of the peoples of Brazil and Mozambique”
(Aguiar and Pacheco, 2016), leading to the engagement of Brazilian
grassroots actors with experiences from a similar, commercial-driven
agricultural program in Brazil – the PRODECER, implemented in the
1970s – with Mozambican activists (Schlesinger, 2014). These parties
included a range of Brazilian and Mozambican civil society actors such
as peasant movements, social justice NGOs, and academics. The Pro-
SAVANA transnational contestation network these actors formed has
acted by means of exchanging information, monitoring developments,
organizing ﬁeld visits, drafting letters to authorities, and producing
audiovisual awareness-raising campaigns, among other practices
(Cabral, 2015; Zanella and Milhorance, 2016; Shankland and
Gonçalves, 2016). The network has managed to obtain more transpar-
ency from the authorities about the intents of ProSAVANA, to secure
room for broader consultations, and, later on, to halt parts of the pro-
gram altogether (Shankland and Gonçalves, 2016: 37).
The attention researchers and grassroots groups paid to ProSAVANA
has also brought Vale into the picture. This is because Vale has de-
monstrated interest to create value-chains along its Mozambican Nacala
logistic corridor through agribusiness investments and because large-
scale agricultural and mining engagements have overlapping impacts
(leading to land-tenure insecurity, environmental degradation, viola-
tion of human rights) on local societies (see Nogueira and Ollinaho,
2013). As such, a number of actors mobilizing against ProSAVANA have
also integrated into the AV – including, for instance, the notorious
Brazilian Landless Movement MST and Mozambican peasant union
UNAC. Yet, in this case, the literature has chieﬂy explored transnational
civil society opposition to Vale through the rural resistance dimension
engendered by the ProSAVANA struggle (see Cabral and Leite, 2015;
Shankland et al., 2016; Milhorance and Bursztyn, 2017), speaking, for
instance, to debates on the internationalization of agrarian contestation
platforms (see Edelman, 2003; Borras, 2010). This scholarship has po-
sitioned Vale as a key player and enabler, among other Brazilian state
and private actors, of agricultural development in the Nacala Corridor,
reinforcing exclusionary patterns of land commodiﬁcation against
which rural-focused and agrarian social movements have mobilized
along a South-South axis.
This literature has, however, seldomly situated the transnational
nature of popular contestation to Vale within the breadth of scholarly
insights on resistance and social protest to extractivism, particularly in
the mining sector (see, for instance, Gordon and Webber, 2008; Acuña,
2015; Hanna et al., 2016; Conde, 2017). Resorting to conceptualiza-
tions of extractive spaces as neoliberal enclaves (see Ferguson, 2005;
Sidaway, 2019) and their interlinked patterns of dispossession
(Bebbington, 2012), securitization (Hönke, 2013), inequality, social
diﬀerentiation (Carmody, 2016), and labor and land commodiﬁcation
(Gordon and Webber, 2008), a range of case studies on Vale has de-
monstrated how mining dynamics resulted in spaces of suﬀering, vul-
nerability, and socio-economic conﬂict, generating protests and forms
of social contestation in response (for Canada, see King, 2017; for In-
donesia, see Murdiﬁn et al., 2018; for New Caledonia, see Filer and Le
Meur, 2017). The literature has long underscored the enclavic form of
development around mining areas in Brazil, particularly with regard to
Vale’s Carajás Mining Complex in the Amazon, the world’s largest iron
ore mine and thus a critical revenue source to the ﬁrm (Vale, 2018b),
reﬂected by social marginalization and the absence of a wider structural
transformation of the economy (Rodrigues, 2003; Da Silva et al., 2011;
Coelho, 2014). The environmental threats to the Amazon, the in-
digenous populations and local communities that the construction of
the mining machinery and related infrastructure, such as hydropower
dams and railways, poses have been similarly documented (Treece,
1987; Fearnside, 1989; Dornas et al., 2019). As a result, various Bra-
zilian civil society groups – across labor, popular sovereignty, leftist
parties, peasant, and liberation theology movements – have challenged
Vale and other mining corporations, increasingly joining forces at the
national-level (Santos and Milanez, 2015; Lyra, 2016); though often
constrained by corporate attempts to co-opt and criminalize dissent
(Milanez et al., 2019). This has recently been complemented by a
growing amount of works documenting the disruptions and civil society
reactions and articulations in the wake of the Mariana and Brumadinho
disasters (Labonne, 2016; Milanez and Santos, 2019; Lyra, 2019; Owen
and Kemp, 2019). In Mozambique, Vale’s project-induced displacement
practices in particular have merited wide scholarly attention, becoming
illustrative of the many misdeeds and the exclusionary nature marking
the country’s nascent mining industry (Lesutis, 2019a; Van der Ploeg
and Vanclay, 2018; Wiegink, 2018; Kirshner and Power, 2015; Human
Rights Watch (HRW, 2013). The continuous precarity within resettle-
ment sites (Lesutis, 2019b) and the hazardous pollution levels from coal
mining (Zitamar, 2019) are pointed to as major sources of discontent-
ment, leading to various forms of protest and collective mobilization.
While Vale’s impacts have been documented and investigated in line
with the ﬁrm’s global extraction activities, the transnational dimension
of resistance against the corporation remains a missing perspective.
While taking note of the AV and its eﬀorts to articulate internationally,
the literature on the opposition to Vale’s extractivism has privileged
localized resistance eﬀorts or, at most, country-speciﬁc networks (see
Tubino et al., 2011; Wanderley, 2012). More in-depth accounts of the
AV have been emphatically descriptive (see Sousa, 2014), self-refer-
ential (carried out by members, see Marshall, 2015a, 2015b; or the
organization itself, see Atingidos, 2016), or, as mentioned above, linked
with ProSAVANA’s agricultural struggle. More broadly, forms of civil
society transnational activism and protest to mining have been fa-
cilitated through the role of Western, professionalized NGOs, including
Human Rights Watch and Oxfam (see Human Rights Watch (HRW,
2013; Oxfam, 2015), industry-led platforms like the International
Council for Mining and Metals (ICMM) (see Curtis, 2007), and through
community and mining-aﬀected grassroots initiatives at the regional
level such as the Alternative Mining Indaba in southern Africa (see
Matsika et al., 2014), and Latin America’s Observatory of Mining
Conﬂict (see Svampa, 2012). But examples of Southern transcontinental
eﬀorts and connections – for instance, between Africa and Latin
America – remain largely unexplored.
The analysis of the AV below seeks to ﬁll these voids, drawing on
the ties forged between Brazilian and Mozambican civil society in
particular to explore the dynamics of resistance to extractivism in a
transnational as well as a South-South conﬁguration. As such, the
analysis seeks to contribute to the literature on contestation to (Vale’s)
extraction while bridging this with a burgeoning literary analysis of
South-South civil society partnerships and advocacy networks. Tarrow’s
(1998, 2005) and Meyer’s (2003, 2004) notion of “political opportunity
structure” provides a productive perspective to do so. Tarrow (1998:
19) deﬁnes political opportunity structure as the “consistent – but not
necessarily formal, permanent, or national – dimensions of the political
struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics.”
Meyer (2004: 126) argues that central to the political opportunity
perspective is the fact that “activists’ prospects for advancing particular
claims, mobilizing supporters, and aﬀecting inﬂuence are context-de-
pendent.” Accordingly, the world outside a movement plays a key role,
enhancing or inhibiting prospects for mobilizing, prioritizing particular
claims over others, inﬂuencing the type of alliances forged, selecting
which strategies are viable, and allowing for engagement with institu-
tional politics and policy (Meyer, 2004). Changes in public policy, the
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reactions of elites, the surrounding political economy, and geopolitical
trends are, for instance, important external circumstances aﬀecting a
movement’s collective strength, symbolic eﬃcacy, and capacity to
enact change (Meyer, 2003; Tarrow, 2005). In line with what Tarrow
(2005) suggests, grievances in and of themselves do not automatically
lead people and groups to organize and deploy resources to push for
social change. Alongside the identiﬁcation of common grievances and
targets, collective action thus requires the opportunistic mobilization of
resources (material, human, and symbolic), framing of demands, and
deployment of contestation strategies to push for change. In the fol-
lowing sections, I discuss these dynamics with regard to the transna-
tional activism embodied by the AV.
4. Vale’s globalization and internationalization as a political
opportunity for transnational contestation
The head of a Mozambican civil society group oﬀering legal assis-
tance to mining-aﬀected populations in Moatize told me they “articu-
late to challenge what is articulated globally.”10 According to him, the
global scale mining companies like Vale operate on ensures the smooth
ﬂow of commodities to global markets, linking self-suﬃcient, secur-
itized spaces to global supply chains. Yet it accentuates exclusionary
patterns of accumulation, drives the dispossession of the vulnerable,
and increases socio-economic marginalization, as the literature con-
ceptualizing mining spaces as neoliberal enclaves has found. The in-
terviewee’s admission also accounted for the launch of and his orga-
nization’s participation in a transnational network to contest Vale, the
International Articulation of those Aﬀected by Vale (AV). Established in
2009, the AV brings together a range of grassroots groups and activists:
from labor unions, human rights groups, lawyers, peasants’ associa-
tions, and environmental activists, to academics, public policy re-
presentatives, cultural organizations, and faith groups.11 In line with
Vale’s international and multifaceted operations – encompassing
mining of varied resources, but also logistics and dealings in the ﬁ-
nancial sector – leverage is seen as better exercised in a similarly
transnational and plural fashion. A prominent voice within Vale re-
sistance circles, Judith Marshall (2015b: 11) has written that “networks
linking only communities or only environmentalists or only trade un-
ionists have limited eﬀectiveness.”
The AV’s founding meeting, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in April
2010, included organizations and participants from 14 countries. The
event was preceded by the drafting of a dossier, which mapped many of
Vale’s engagements in Brazil and abroad, and identiﬁed the respective
groups involved in disputes with the company (Atingidos pela Vale,
2010). Viewed as a point of departure, the document was described as
the ﬁrst collective eﬀort to challenge both “the image that Vale con-
structs for itself at the symbolic level” and Vale’s representation as a
Brazilian icon (idem, 6). According to a Brazilian researcher involved in
the AV’s founding, while in the beginning there was no centralized
leadership in order “to avoid an NGO-ization of the articulation and to
keep it open for various movements,” an executive secretariat, often
represented by a key AV activist, was later on created to help with the
mobilization of resources and the organization of events.12
Though the AV is seen in this paper as a platform that enabled the
forging of South–South ties from the ground up between Brazil and
Mozambique, the origins of the movement is directly tied to events in
Canada. In 2009, more than 3000 workers at Vale Inco’s nickel mines in
Sudbury, Port Colborne, and Voisey’s Bay, Canada, went on strike.13
Represented by the United Steelworkers (USW) trade union, laborers
have brought operations to a halt following Vale’s attempts to re-
negotiate pension beneﬁts and bonus payments in the wake of the 2008
ﬁnancial crisis and nickel’s consequent price decline. After a series of
stalled talks, the increasingly bitter strike lasted for almost a year in
Sudbury and Port Colborne and for 18 months in Voisey’s Bay, making
these events the longest walkout in Vale’s history (Peters, 2010; King,
2017). To the Brazilian researcher involved in the AV’s founding,
“Brazilians go home” messages were common on the strike banners in
Canada.14 These developments have in turn given rise to the articula-
tion of a transnational solidarity network between those aﬀected by
Vale in Canada and in Brazil. Noting an inversion of exploitation pat-
terns – a Southern ﬁrm exploiting Northern workers rather than the
other way around – my interviewee declared: “For the ﬁrst time there
was a reverse solidarity from Brazil towards them. This case being a
South-North cooperation with Canada.”15
Concurrently, what started as an eﬀort to support and solidarize
with the Canadian strike has laid the initial foundations for the estab-
lishment of a broader, transnational network to contest Vale’s corporate
practices and mining activities worldwide. This has corresponded with
other concomitant eﬀorts. For instance, the organization of a workshop
on the internationalization of Brazilian ﬁrms during the 2009 World
Social Forum in Belém, Brazil, brought together representatives of
communities, mostly from across Latin America, aﬀected by Brazilian
corporate projects.16 Personal ties and given coincidences have also
mattered: Brazilian activists and researchers completing their post-
graduate studies in Canada at the time were instrumental in facilitating
exchanges between groups aﬀected by Vale in Canada and in Latin
America. While the events with the USW in Canada were crucial to kick-
start and give shape to an international contestation articulation against
Vale, the subsequent resolution of the Canadian strikes in 2010 has
tempered the union’s mobilization impetus within a transnational set-
ting. “The Steelworkers were fundamental. But after they won the
strike, they kind of jumped out,” the Brazilian researcher involved in
the AV’s founding said.17 Although the ties with the Canadian workers
became lukewarm, setting up an international movement against Vale
nonetheless contributed to the establishment and strengthening of other
connections.
This is what happened in the case of the Brazilian and Mozambican
parties. After the initial, mutual lack of awareness about Vale-related
struggles in the country of the other, the creation of the AV meant that
“the Brazilian relationship with Mozambique went from water to
wine.”18 Arguably, language and cultural aﬃnities have played a key
role in fostering and facilitating such ties, but personal factors were
once again crucial in this case. Relations were specially boosted in the
wake of a grant obtained by a group of Brazilian researchers linked to
the AV in 2012 to conduct a comparative study and ﬁeldwork on the
extractive industries in Brazil and Mozambique. As such, contacts that
were already in place due to the AV’s establishment – but that were
often mediated through a third-party – acquired a real, tangible di-
mension. Speaking about their trip to Mozambique, the Brazilian re-
searcher involved in the AV’s founding declared that “our comprehen-
sion of the Mozambican reality, our comprehension of Vale has become
totally diﬀerent.”19 This has reportedly set the stage for other sub-
sequent civil society trips and exchanges among those aﬀected by Vale
across the South Atlantic, from Brazil to Mozambique and vice-versa.
10 Interview, NGO director. Tete, Mozambique, October 2018.
11 The full overview of founding members can be found at Atingidos Pela Vale
(2010: 156-157).
12 Interview, researcher. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, April 2019.
13 Vale’s Canada operations followed the acquisition of Canadian nickel
mining corporation Inco in 2006, leading to the establishment of Vale Inco –
(footnote continued)
nowadays Vale Canada Limited.
14 Interview, researcher. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, April 2019.
15 Ibid.
16 The World Social Forum is an annual meeting of grassroots organizations
championing counter-hegemonic globalization.
17 Interview, researcher. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, April 2019.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
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The geopolitical conjuncture at the time, as discussed, was one of
greater international prominence of the Southern emerging economies
and their ﬁrms, leveraged by the 2000s commodities super-cycle, and as
such set the stage for the widening global role of companies like Vale
(see Fernández et al., 2017). The 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, fueled by anti-
globalization sentiments, has in turn exposed that the Vale’s outward
expansion was not without friction, as demonstrated by the “Brazilians
go home” banners in Canada. In line with this paper’s literary review,
an increasing mutual awareness about Vale-related struggles across
Latin America and Africa in anti-globalization fora increased the per-
ception that a South–South economic landscape does not necessarily
translate into better corporate behavior on the ground – as otherwise
suggested by the above-cited state and corporate discourses. All of these
factors have not only provided a raison d’être for transnational protests
against Vale but have also increased the political value of such a con-
testation platform, which endorsed broader, post-2008 anti-globaliza-
tion calls and took a critical perspective on the emerging – yet little
challenged – ﬂows of South–South economic relations. Adding to that,
the resolution of the Canadian strikes, which saw some of the workers’
demands met and to which the establishment of the AV provided an
important backing, reinforced a sense of political eﬃcacy and en-
couraged subsequent mobilization, particularly among the Brazilian
and Mozambican grassroots groups aﬀected by Vale. This speaks to
Tarrow’s (2005) argument that the increase in internationalization –
expressed here by denser relations across states and private sector of-
ﬁcials – poses challenges, thus creating an opportunity structure to
channel resistance to globalization and inviting transnational activism
and the creation of cross-border coalitions.
Moreover, in line with the Mozambican government’s political
strategy to pursue a development model premised on the extractive
projects (Orre and Ronning, 2017: 10), Vale has started its coal mining
operations in the country in 2011. Notwithstanding, the novelty of re-
lated large-scale investments in Mozambique coupled with the gov-
ernment’s inexperience in managing such processes and local civil so-
ciety groups’ limited to non-existent exposure to multinational
companies led, as documented by the literature, to a range of mis-
handlings and rights violations, notably with regard to project-induced
displacement practices. All these signals in the political and economic
conjuncture have however, provided opportunities for the articulation
and the strengthening of ties between the Brazilian and Mozambican
parties within the AV. The opportunity to engage in a transnational
mobilization eﬀort was not only a way to gain insight and knowledge
into synergistic experiences elsewhere for the Mozambican actors, but
also an opportunity to advocate for socially-sound parameters for cor-
porate and state responsibilities in face of Mozambique’s incipient ex-
tractive boom. Moreover, the outset of Vale’s coal-mining, the estab-
lishment of ProSAVANA, both in 2011 at the height of Brazil’s
“corporate push” into Mozambique (see Rossi, 2015), reinforced by the
existence of a range of overlapping grievances, further contributed to
create momentum for transnational resistance connecting Mozambique
to Brazil, and vice-versa. The expansion of Brazilian FDI in Mozambique
has thus oﬀered a political opportunity structure for grassroots groups
across the two nations to act internationally, raising awareness about
common struggles and establishing dialogue platforms (see also
Milhorance and Bursztyn, 2017). Besides building on these external
opportunities and incentives, acting together contentiously, as sug-
gested by Tarrow (2005) and Meyer (2004), requires the mobilization
of material, human, and ideological resources to voice demands and to
pursue resistance goals. I now turn to this dimension of the AV’s
struggle, addressing how the network’s contestation potential was
mobilized and to which ends.
5. Taking (transnational) action against Vale
“How can we pinch Vale’s image?”, inquired a representative of a
Brazilian advocacy organization acting on behalf of populations
eﬀected by dam-related issues, who was also linked to AV.20 To answer
her own question, she claimed that “counter-information is our major
strategy” and highlighted how many of the AV’s actions seek to chal-
lenge Vale’s international image, which she regarded as tainted by both
blue- and green-washing techniques.21 As such, the AV exposes and
opposes how the company publicly depicts itself as a contributor to
development, economic growth, and employment generation. They
contest the advertised discourse that this is all carried out in ways
consonant to international standards through, for example, association
with the UN Global Compact– and hence the reference to the blue color
– as well as sustainable and environmentally sound, i.e. green, prac-
tices. This view, which the AV challenges, comes across particularly
strong in Vale’s yearly Sustainability Reports, through which the com-
pany conveys a message of social and environmental responsibility,
with regular mentions of compliance with international safeguards on
human rights, labor, the environment, and good governance (see Vale,
2019: 4).
To provide the missing, bottom-up counterpoint, the AV has pub-
lished a series of Unsustainability Reports (2010, 2011, 2013, 2015).
The reports have, among other things, criticized corporate abuse and
perceived violations of human and labor rights, oﬀering an instrument
for grassroots groups and communities to tell their own stories. In a
somewhat satirical fashion, the outputs are in similar reporting and
graphic formats as Vale’s Sustainability reports. For instance, whereas
Vale’s oﬃcial 2015 Sustainability Report (Vale, 2016: 13) states that
the company’s mission is “to transform natural resources into prosperity
and sustainable development”; the AV’s 2015 Unsustainability Report
(Atingidos pela Vale, 2016: 2) states that Vale’s mission is “to transform
natural resources into catalysts for continually growing proﬁts for
shareholders, disregarding the rights of workers, communities, tradi-
tional peoples and future generations, as well as their expectations to a
life with dignity.” The AV’s website and other outputs similarly high-
light how the movement’s (counter-) communication makes regular
parallels to Vale’s communication materials. For instance, graphic
patterns applied on Vale’s oﬃcial promotional material are used in the
AV reports’ illustrations to depict environmental, labor, and social
abuses experienced by the aﬀected populations. Another signiﬁcant
outcome the movement’s “expose and oppose” strategy yielded is that
Vale was elected the “Worst Company in the World” in the 2012 Public
Eye Awards, held at the margins of the Davos World Economic Forum.
Aided by a strong online campaign propelled by the AV, the corporation
was “awarded” for “repeated human rights abuses, inhumane working
conditions, and the ruthless exploitation of nature” (Public Eye, 2012).
Another particularly eﬀective counter-information move was through
the targeting of Vale shareholders by becoming a shareholder itself. To
do so, AV activists have collectively bought Vale stocks, which entitled
them to participate in shareholders’ meetings. In these meetings, acti-
vists would express their views and make demands from within, using
their position as leverage over the other shareholders’ ﬁnances and
their proximity to the corporation to convey messages and to get re-
sponses to their demands.
The AV has also held regular, movement-wide meetings “to debate
experiences and design strategies to confront violations committed by
Vale all over the world” (FASE, 2015a). Five annual meetings were
organized between 2010 and 2015, and the gatherings were typically
followed by the drafting of a ﬁnal letter expressing the concerns of the
populations aﬀected by Vale’s activities. Criticism would also be di-
rected to the governments of countries in which Vale operates, for their
degree of interconnectedness with the company – through, inter alia,
owning shares, subsidized lending, lenient legislation – and for con-
tributing to the perpetuation of inequalities and violations of their own
populations’ rights (FASE, 2015b). Moreover, some of these reunions
20 Interview, NGO representative. São Paulo, Brazil, April 2019.
21 Ibid.
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were strategically timed and held at symbolic locations. For example,
the ﬁrst, founding meeting in 2010 took place in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
where Vale is headquartered. It occurred as the Canadian strike was
unfolding and it took place in the same period as the company’s general
meeting of shareholders was scheduled for. The third gathering, also
held in Rio, took place during the UN Rio+20 Conference in 2012. The
ﬁfth and last meeting to date occurred in the city of Ouro Preto, at the
heart of Brazil’s so-called Iron Quadrangle in the state of Minas Gerais,
where Vale has originally started mining in the late 1940s. Some of
these meetings were also accompanied by the organization of ﬁeld visits
(caravanas) to Vale’s mining areas, assembling civil society re-
presentatives of various countries and backgrounds. These visits were
meant to provide eyewitness accounts of the reality of Vale’s projects
and a platform for comparisons and exchange of experiences. This was
the case for the AV’s founding meeting in 2010, when the organization
of two caravanas preceded the event: one to the mining sites in the state
of Minas Gerais, and the other covering Vale’s “northern system” in the
Amazon, where the Carajás Mining Complex is located (see Atingidos
pela Vale, 2010: 141–150). As described by the earlier-quoted Mo-
zambican NGO director who participated in the Carajás visit, the trip
provided an opportunity “to see the situation in loco, as a way to
counter-balance: contrasting (the Carajás rail corridor) with the Nacala
Corridor (in Mozambique), drawing comparisons, analogies, and we
saw that Vale’s behavior is the same.”
In the wake of the Mariana and Brumadinho catastrophes, grass-
roots groups within the AV also play a crucial role in monitoring the
tragedies closely, serving as up-to-date, bottom-up and continual source
information, especially whenever media attention started to fade away.
This is particularly highlighted through the work of the Brazilian and
AV-aﬃliated Águas e Serras Casa Branca social movement, which has
played an active role in the aftermath of the tragedies, monitoring
corporate as well as state responses and voicing the opinions of re-
sidents and victims in the aﬀected areas (Atingidos pela Vale, 2019b).
The AV has similarly issued statements recalling several of the warnings
given by communities, activists, and employees ahead of the tragedies.
Preemptively, in their view, these could have possibly prevented or
mitigated the calamitous consequences had the company and public
authorities listened and taken demands and complaints more seriously
(see Atingidos pela Vale, 2019a). Yet, despite the recent spike in an-
nouncements and website posts following the Brumadinho tragedy, the
Articulation has experienced an overall downtrend in recent years.
Specially after 2015, this has been evidenced by the halt of the annual
meetings and the fact that its presence has been mainly restricted to the
online domain. Building on Tarrow (1998, 2005) and Meyer’s (2003,
2004) notion of political opportunity structure guiding this paper, it
may be concluded that while given political opportunities create in-
centives to take action, variations in political processes surrounding the
ensuing struggle may also hamper collective mobilization. In the next,
ﬁnal section of this paper, this downtrend is account for by the chan-
ging circumstances in the broader political and economic environments
in both Brazil and Mozambique. I argue that these “externalities” have
contributed to a less favorable political opportunity structure for the
transnational (and also South–South) activism embodied by the AV,
altering strategic postures and the incentives for coalition-building.
6. Is transnational activism withering in light of a less favorable
political opportunity structure?
The turbulence in Brazil’s political landscape, set in motion by na-
tion-wide street protests in 2013 (see Vicino and Fahlberg, 2017), was
aggravated around 2015 by a stagnating economy and a corruption
investigation that halted several of the country’s leading ﬁrms’ inter-
nationalization processes (see Melo, 2016; Lima-de-Oliveira, 2019).
This has led many Brazilian grassroots groups within the AV to con-
centrate eﬀorts and scarce resources on growing domestic challenges.
Priority has thus been given to confronting austerity reforms and the
perceived loosening of environmental, labor, and social-welfare safe-
guards that came with the enactment of economic reforms and the
sweeping changes in the country’s leadership and political conﬁgura-
tion – from a left-wing-oriented administration, which was ousted by a
contentious impeachment process, to a decisive swing to the right
symbolized by Bolsonaro’s rise to power in 2019. At the same time,
Brazilian groups countering extraction have become increasingly ar-
ticulated into a mainly domestically-oriented and broader mining re-
sistance – as opposed to Vale-speciﬁc – platform, namely the Movement
for Popular Sovereignty in Mining (MAM), which gained potency
around 2013 (see Lyra, 2016). Many of the MAM’s grassroots groups
have also remained within the AV and the two movements are in many
ways complementary. Notwithstanding, the fact that notorious and
large mass movements such as the Brazilian Landless Workers’ Move-
ment (MST) and the Movement of People Aﬀected by Dams (MAB) have
increasingly channeled their anti-mining eﬀorts through the MAM has
“cooled down” the AV.22 Moreover, with the central node of the AV’s
strategic thinking, networking, and resource mobilization passing
through Brazilian organizations such as FASE, Justiça Global, and
PACS, a more inward-looking strategic posture has similarly drained
energy away from the transnational civil society ﬂows nurturing the
AV.23 In times of more challenging circumstances, the diﬀuse nature of
the articulation – devoid of a structured, permanent leadership and
more dependent on the ad hoc eﬀorts of given individuals in NGOs,
academia, or trade unions – reinforced these diﬃculties.
In Mozambique, this has been followed by the pragmatic forging of
other partnerships. For instance, the aforementioned organization
providing legal assistance to mining-aﬀected populations in Moatize
has increasingly engaged with Danish and Canadian NGOs in anti-Vale
eﬀorts, as exempliﬁed by their initiative to exert pressure on pension
funds in these northern countries that are shareholders in the mining
corporation.24 Moreover, as Lesutis (2019a) suggests, the hardening of
tensions between the country’s governing Frelimo party and the main
opposition party Renamo – fueled by intermittent violent clashes from
2013 through 2017 – has created a dynamic of political violence and
repression, which the recent insurgency in the gas-rich northern pro-
vince of Cabo Delgado has made even worse.25 These recent develop-
ments have sparked fear among those engaged in civil society mobili-
zation eﬀorts, as the government has been incentivized to increase
surveillance and violent state reactions to dissent, driving Vale-aﬀected
populations, for example, to employ less confrontational strategies to
deal with their precarity in mining spaces (Lesutis, 2019b: 47). Finally,
while the Mozambican society has had only limited exposure to and
only seldomly mobilized around large-scale economic projects in the
wake of Vale’s establishment during the late 2000s (around when the
AV was founded), the economic landscape has undergone major
transformations. The intensiﬁcation of coal mining, gas discoveries, and
agricultural investments throughout the 2010s has provided more op-
portunities – tied to increased awareness on the impacts of economic
projects – for civil society coalition-building, either with grassroots
groups elsewhere in the country or other international partners (see
Symons, 2016).
In light of a less favorable conﬁguration of political opportunities,
especially after 2015, the AV’s activism has been expressed less through
on-site, face-to-face interactions (i.e. meetings, ﬁeld visits) or broader
outreaching initiatives (i.e. detailed reports on the aﬀected populations,
global campaigns) and more through targeted, often reactive actions
following a major contentious Vale-related event (i.e. condemnation
notes, requests demanding accountability from authorities). Regular
22 Interview, researcher. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, April 2019.
23 Ibid.
24 Interview, NGO director. Tete, Mozambique, October 2018.
25 For more information and updates, see: https://www.acaps.org/country/
mozambique/crisis/violent-insurgency-in-cabo-delgado
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activities such as the participation in shareholders’ meetings have not
been discontinued, but have been prominently pushed forward by the
individual eﬀorts of given activists. On the other hand, the AV’s con-
tinued online presence, especially the Articulation’s website and
Facebook proﬁle, has enabled the movement to draw on e-activism to
voice concerns and demands, and to build institutional memory by
means of keeping track of past initiatives. Moreover, faster cost-free,
cross-border communication platforms such as WhatsApp have been
crucial to keep ties and contacts alive, thus contributing to preserve the
movement’s “skeleton”. Communication and social media platforms
may similarly oﬀer the possibility to revive mobilization prospects once
there are more favorable political opportunities for their realization.
Paradoxically, major catastrophes such as Brumadinho are telling in
this regard. The fact that Brumadinho made international headlines,
occurred after a similar major disaster (Mariana), and was simulta-
neously a social, labor, and environmental tragedy oﬀers new mo-
mentum for reviving Vale contestation eﬀorts in a transnational, mul-
tifaceted fashion. A Brazilian activist, hopeful that there would be a re-
strengthening of international eﬀorts to challenge Vale – while recalling
the pledges of the then newly inaugurated Bolsonaro government to
loosen environmental safeguards and mining regulations in Brazil and
Vale’s move to expand its coal mining concession in Mozambique –
declared that Brumadinho can be in many ways a “necessary evil”,
oﬀering a timely opportunity “for us to put forward initiatives and try
to change things.”26
7. Conclusion
In this paper, I have built on the notion of political opportunity
structure to discuss how the globalized scope and increasingly inter-
nationalized presence of the Brazilian mining corporation Vale S.A has
concomitantly oﬀered opportunities for contestation to the ﬁrm to be
exercised transnationally and along a South–South axis. I have done so
by analyzing the politics of mobilization of the International
Articulation of those Aﬀected by Vale (AV), paying particular attention
to the ties forged between Brazilian and Mozambican grassroots groups.
In this vein, this paper has attempted to contribute to the literature on
resistance dynamics in the extractive industries, exploring this in a
transnational conﬁguration, and with an emphasis on the articulation of
civil society eﬀorts across the Global South.
In line with the conceptual grid foregrounded in this paper, the
mere existence of a transnational set of struggles against Vale and
grievances inﬂicted by it is not suﬃcient to explain why social groups
have articulated internationally to challenge the ﬁrm. The political op-
portunity structure – the external circumstances aﬀecting the struggle –
also plays a key role, aﬀecting a movement’s collective strength, eﬃ-
cacy, and capacity to enact change. I have discussed these dynamics
with regard to the transnational activism embodied by the AV, ana-
lyzing the political opportunities that have led to its emergence, how
these opportunities were harnessed in collective contestation strategies,
and the role that a shifting political and economic conjuncture play in
shaping mobilization prospects.
I have argued that favorable geopolitical and economic circum-
stances – deﬁned, for instance, by the greater international protagonism
of the Southern emerging economies and a commodities super-cycle
and in the late 2000s – have not only contributed to Vale’s expansion
into Mozambique and elsewhere but have also set a favorable stage for
articulation to be forged, from below, against these processes. While the
AV’s transnationalism has emerged out of a peculiar eﬀort aimed at
supporting Canadian mining workers on strike, it has consolidated and
strengthened other resistance ties, as was the case between Brazilian
and Mozambican civil society. In the context of Brazil–Mozambique
relations more speciﬁcally, the forging of these South–South
connections from below contributed to advance a critical, bottom-up
perspective to the otherwise benevolent state and corporate South-
South framings on Vale’s suitability to explore coal in Mozambique.
These political opportunities were harnessed in contestation stra-
tegies that have brought awareness to a shared spectrum of Vale-related
struggles and grievances across the Southern Atlantic and elsewhere,
strengthening and increasing the geographical reach of resistance ef-
forts. As such, the AV’s transnational challenge to Vale was leveraged
by means of amplifying counter-information ﬂows, drawing on corpo-
rate shareholders to exert pressure, promoting international campaigns,
and keeping memories of mining tragedies alive. Yet, ensuing changes
in the political and economic landscapes, especially in Brazil and
Mozambique, have in turn hampered this mobilization capacity, high-
lighting some of the challenges for sustaining a broader mining-re-
sistance platform across the Global South. For the Brazilian grassroots
groups in the AV, considerable political turmoil and a bleak macro-
economic outlook in Brazil have contributed to a reorientation of mo-
bilization goals from the transnational to the domestic level. In
Mozambique, this was followed by grassroots pragmatically engaging in
other civil society alliances in light of the country’s growing extractive
economy and by the adoption of a less confrontational stance against a
backdrop of increasing political repression. In recent years, the trans-
national activism embodied by the AV has thus been expressed less
through regular and steady arrangements and more through a reactive,
often digitally conveyed posture to events involving Vale. Yet, even in
times of a less favorable political opportunity structure, the Articulation
was not entirely dissolved. The online domain and cross-border com-
munication platforms have enabled the grouping to subsist, which
provides prospects for transnational mobilization eﬀorts against Vale to
resurge once there are new windows of opportunities, for example in
the aftermath of a major tragedy such as Brumadinho.
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